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How do the risks of living long and facing high medical expenses 
affect the elderly’s saving behavior?
by Mariacristina De Nardi, senior economist and research advisor, Eric French, senior economist, and John B. Jones, associate 
professor of economics, University at Albany, State University of New York
This article shows that the elderly, especially those with high lifetime incomes, maintain 
large asset holdings to account for the possibility of their living a long time and facing 
high medical expenses.1
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1.  Median net worth of single people aged 72–81 in 1995
PI quintile  Assets in 1995   Assets in 2002
 (  - - - - - - thousands of 1998 dollars - - - - - - )
Bottom  2.1 0.3
Second  21.8 13.9
Third  59.2 45.4
Fourth  81.9 59.3
Top  154.4 142.5
Notes: Permanent income (PI) is the sum of Social Security benefits plus defined benefit 
pension income. Assets (or net worth) are the sum of all assets less mortgages and other 
debts. The Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old has information on the 
value of housing and real estate, autos, liquid assets (including money market accounts, 
savings accounts, and Treasury bills), individual retirement accounts, Keogh plans, 
stocks, the value of farms or businesses, mutual funds, bonds, and “other” assets.
source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the University of Michigan, Institute 
for Social Research, Survey Research Center, Asset and Health Dynamics Among the 
Oldest Old.
Although the elderly have a lot of wealth, 
we still do not fully understand their 
patterns of saving behavior.2 Many el-
derly individuals keep large amounts 
of wealth even as they near the ends of 
their lives.3 Furthermore, as one study4 
shows, income-rich households are es-
pecially frugal. Figure 1 
illustrates these ten-
dencies with a sample 
of single Americans 
from the Asset and 
Health Dynamics Among 
the Oldest Old (AHEAD) 
data set—an auxiliary 
survey of the University 
of Michigan’s Health 
and Retirement Study. 
It shows median assets 
by “permanent in-
come” (PI)5 quintile 
for individuals who 
were aged 72–81 in 
1995 and still alive in 
2002. Assets decline 
with age, but slowly; and as PI grows, 
assets decline less and less. Assets for 
the cohort aged 82–91 in 1995 (not 
shown in figure 1) exhibit similar pat-
terns, although they decline somewhat 
more rapidly. 
A country’s saving affects its level of 
investment—and, ultimately, its level of 
wealth. Understanding the elderly’s 
saving behavior is essential to under-
standing how tax and transfer policies 
will affect a country’s saving. For exam-
ple, the effect of medical spending on 
saving rates has entered the debate on 
whether the Chinese government should 
nationalize health care.6 Nationalizing 
health care might reduce saving because 
nobody would need to save for medical 
care when they become old. 
Among the motivations for saving are 
the risks of living long and having high 
medical expenses in old age. These mo-
tivations are likely to be especially strong 
in the United States for two reasons. First, 
the U.S. government pension scheme, 
Social Security, replaces only about 
45% of pre-retirement income. Second, 
despite nearly universal health insurance 
for the elderly through Medicare, many 
medical services, such as nursing home 
care, are virtually uninsured. 
In recent research,7 we quantify the 
importance of these forces by estimating 
and simulating a rich model of saving 
behavior. Our work builds upon earlier 
analyses of life-cycle saving.8 Our model 
accounts for differences across PI groups 
in terms of life spans and medical ex-
penses, as well as the risks of living es-
pecially long and having especially high 
medical expenses. The model fits the data 
well—it matches, among other things, the 
asset patterns shown in figure 1—which gives us confidence in its predictions. 
We find that the risks of living long and 
facing high medical expenses go a long 
way toward explaining the elderly’s 
saving decisions. Spe-
cifically, these risks can 
explain why the elder-
ly, and especially the 
income-rich elderly, 
run down their assets 
so slowly.
Life expectancy and 
life span uncertainty
Life spans vary greatly 
in both predictable and 
unpredictable ways. 
Using mortality rates 
estimated from the 
AHEAD, we find that 
rich people, women, 
and healthy people 
live much longer than 
their poor, male, and 
sick counterparts. Two 
extremes illustrate this 
point: An unhealthy 
70-year-old man at the 
20th percentile of the 
PI distribution expects 
to live only six more 
years, i.e., to age 76. 
In contrast, a healthy 
70-year-old woman at 
the 80th percentile of 
the PI distribution ex-
pects to live 17 more 
years, thus making it to 
age 87. Such significant 
differences in life ex-
pectancy could, all else 
being equal, lead to 
significant differences 
in saving behavior. 
To better understand 
how predictable vari-
ations in life expec-
tancy affect saving 
behavior, we use our 
model to simulate 
the net worth of the 
AHEAD birth-year 
cohort whose mem-
bers were aged 72–76 
in 1995. Figure 2 dis-
plays net worth pro-
files generated by our 
model for PI quintiles. The solid lines 
in figure 2 show median net worth for 
the baseline model. Consistent with 
the evidence presented in figure 1, the 
median net worth of the lowest PI quin-
tile is close to zero and hence does not 
even show up in the figure. All other 
households decumulate their net worth 
very slowly, with those in the highest 
PI group starting off at almost $160,000 
in median net worth at age 74 and re-
taining over $100,000 until well over 
age 90. This, too, is consistent with the 
empirical evidence.
The other lines in figure 2 reflect in-
creasingly pessimistic assumptions 
about how long people expect to live. 
For the dashed-dot lines, we adjust each 
individual’s survival probabilities to 
those of someone who is always in bad 
health and has no chance of going 
back to good health. This reduces life 
expectancy at age 70 by two to four years, 
depending on gender and permanent 
income. For the dashed lines, we assume 
that besides being always sick, everyone 
has the life expectancy of a male, which 
is four to five years less than that of a 
female. Finally, for the crossed lines, we 
add the effect of being at the lowest 
possible PI level to all of the other effects. 
Under this worst-case scenario, every 
70 year old expects to live five more years.
Each incremental reduction in expected 
life span generates a noticeable drop in 
net worth, with the largest effects (in 
absolute terms) for the highest PI house-
holds. For people who are aged 90 and 
older and in the highest PI quintile, 
being always sick reduces median assets 
by around $15,000. For the same people, 
being male and sick reduces assets by a 
further $20,000; and being poor, male, 
and sick results in assets dropping nearly 
another $20,000. In short, predictable 
differences in life expectancy related to 
health, gender, and permanent income 
are important to understanding savings 
patterns across these groupings, and 
the effect of each factor is of a similar 
order of magnitude.
In addition to the systematic differences 
just discussed, individuals face significant 
uncertainty over their life spans. For 
example, a healthy 70-year-old woman 
at the 80th percentile of the permanent 
income distribution, who expects to live 
17 years more, faces a 14% chance of 
living 25 years more, to age 95. Even an 
unhealthy man at the 20th percentile 
2. Median net worth under different mortality assumptions
Notes: Permanent income (PI) is the sum of Social Security benefits plus defined  
benefit pension income. The sample comprises the birth-year cohort aged 72–76 in 
1995 from the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old, broken down into  
PI quintiles (the lowest one’s median net worth is so low that it does not appear here). 
source: De Nardi, French, and Jones (2009b).
assets in 1998 dollars × 104











In bad health  Low PI, male, 
and in bad health 
Male and in bad health 
age
3. Median net worth with and without life span uncertainty
Notes: Permanent income (PI) is the sum of Social Security benefits plus defined  
benefit pension income. The sample comprises the birth-year cohort aged 72–76 in 
1995 from the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old, broken down into  
PI quintiles (the lowest one’s median net worth is so low that it does not appear here). 
source: De Nardi, French, and Jones (2009b).
assets in 1998 dollars × 104










Low PI, male, and in bad health without life span 
uncertainty (exactly five years left to live)
age
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faces an 8% chance of living to age 85—
more than twice his expected life span 
of six years. The risk of living far past one’s 
expected life span is large and, under 
incomplete annuitization, a potentially 
important reason why so many elderly 
people run down their assets so slowly. 
To illustrate the effects of life span un-
certainty, we present in figure 3 two sets 
of simulations. First, as in figure 2, the 
crossed lines show predicted net worth 
when everyone faces 
the mortality rates of 
an unhealthy man 
with low permanent 
income. This man has 
an expected life span 
of five years, but faces 
the risk of living 
much longer. For the 
circled lines, this risk 
is eliminated; all indi-
viduals in these simu-
lations expect to live 
exactly five years and 
then die. When the 
risk of living longer 
than five years is elim-
inated, so is the value 
of having assets after 
five years; thus, indi-
viduals deplete their 
net worth by the end 
of their fifth year. In 
contrast, most individ-
uals facing uncertain 
life spans still have sig-
nificant asset holdings 
after five years, even 
when facing the most 
pessimistic survival 
prospects. This com-
parison shows that at 
realistic levels of annu-
itization, the risk of 
outliving one’s ex-
pected life span has a 
large effect on the el-
derly’s saving behavior.
Medical expenses
Figure 4 shows out-of-
pocket medical ex-
penses—which include 
expenses for hospital 
appointments, nursing 
home stays, and doctor 
visits, as well as drugs and insurance 
premiums—for women born in 1922 
who are in good health. Figure 4 shows 
that medical expenses rise rapidly with 
age, especially for those with high income. 
For example, a healthy woman at the 
80th percentile of the PI distribution 
(gray line) sees her average annual med-
ical expenses rise from less than $2,000 
at age 70 to about $30,000 at age 100. 
This feature of the data proves crucial 
to explaining the asset decumulation 
of the elderly. Medical expenses that 
rise with age provide elderly house-
holds a strong incentive to save, and 
medical expenses that rise with perma-
nent income encourage the rich to be 
especially frugal. 
Figure 5 shows the simulated asset pro-
files that arise when there is life span 
uncertainty but no medical costs for the 
baseline (solid lines) and an unhealthy 
man with low PI (crossed lines). The im-
portance of medical expenses in house-
hold saving decisions can be seen by 
comparing the solid and crossed lines in 
figure 2 with those in figure 5. Compared 
with the model with medical expenses in 
figure 2, the model with no medical costs 
in figure 5 implies a much faster rate of 
asset decumulation. Not surprisingly, 
this change is most pronounced for 
people in the top PI quintile, who other-
wise would have faced the most dramatic 
increase in medical expenses.
Collectively, figures 2–5 suggest that a 
significant part of the elderly’s saving 
behavior can be explained by health-
related factors: predictable and unpre-
dictable variations in life spans, as well 
as out-of-pocket medical expenses.
4. Average out-of-pocket medical expenses
Notes: Permanent income (PI) is the sum of Social Security benefits plus defined 
benefit pension income. The sample comprises only women born in 1922 who are 
in good health from the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old.
source: De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006). 
1998 dollars
5. Median net worth with no medical expenses
Notes: Permanent income (PI) is the sum of Social Security benefits plus defined 
benefit pension income. The sample comprises the birth-year cohort aged 72–76 in 
1995 from the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old, broken down into  
PI quintiles (the lowest one’s median net worth is so low that it does not appear here).  
source: De Nardi, French, and Jones (2009b).
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